In this paper, we propose the flexible Bayesian approach to describe the psychological decision making process. That is, by easing the Bayesian Axiom system, we come up with higher order probability and flexible utitiliy assessment. The purpose of this paper is to check whether the flexible Bayesian approach can explain some counter-intuitive examples. Using a questionnaire, we asked the subjects (undergraduate students, n = 203) to evaluate the subjective probabilities and the betting preferences in the Ellsberg's Urn Problem and the Three Prisoners Problem. For the Ellsberg's Urn Problem, higher order probability was adequate to explain the paradox, more so than the non-additive representation of uncertainty. For the Three Prisoners Problem, higher order mathematical probability fails to explain the subjr<ts' tesponses, which are stubbornly against Bayesian probability, but the fuzzy representation of higher order probability by means of the membership function was adequate for the explanation of this paradox.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the plausibility of the Bayesian model as a descriptive model for decision making. It is well known that various data have been accumulated which show that human decision making does not obey the Bayesian rule (e.g. Kahnernan, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982) . But in these studies, the Bayesian rules are treated as very rigorous rules. Our understanding is that all the Bayesian rules and probability laws come from a few basic axioms, and as long as the probability or preference judgment is coherent with these axioms, the Bayesian approach is very flexible in nature.
Therefore it is absolutely necessary to examine closely these axioms, and judge what the Bayesian coherence principle reveals and what it does not.
There have been quite a number of attempts for this kind of axiomization since Von Neuman and Morgenstern (1947) . For the argument of this paper, we introduced a basic axiom system, which is successful in separating "subjective probability"
and "utility". The essential part of the axioms are as follows; (3-a) If A > B, ƒÎA > ƒÎB.
(3-b) If A n B = 0, the probability of A u B is equal to 't, + IT,. (1) We give up the comparability assumption of all uncertain events. Still we can discuss the probability measures for such events that we would compare with results of a standard statistical experiment.
(2) We give up the transitivity assumption and hence uniqueness of probability measure, considering human dynamic diversity. Instead, we assume subjective probability behaves as a random variable, and assume the existence of the distribution of subjective probability, which is called higher order probability. Note that the idea of higher order probability is not new in the Bayesian context (see Good, 1965 Good, , 1971 Goldsmith & Sahlin, 1983; Rapoport, Wallsten, & Cox, 1987) Hypothesis III : Higher order probability is also subject to mathematical probability law.
Methods

Materials
The data are gathered using the following question list consisting of six problems. These problems are adopted from the Ellsberg's Urn Problem (Ellsberg, 1961) and the Three Prisoners Problem (Mosteller, 1965) . 1. Ellsberg's Urn Problem (I-a) There are 50 red balls and 50 white balls in the urn. when one ball is taken randomly from the urn, subjects are asked to evaluate the probability that the ball is red.
(I-h) There are red, white and black balls in the urn. The number of red balls is 30. The number of white balls plus the number of black balls is 60, but the ratio of white and black balls is unknown. When one ball is taken randomly from this urn, the subjects are asked to evaluate the probability that the ball is red, white, black, red or white, red or black, and black or white.
Tennis Problem
There are two tennis players whose names are
Mr. Akagi and Mr. Shirai. But we have no information except their names. The subjects are asked to evaluate the probability of Mr. Akagi's winning when they play tennis.
Three Prisoners Problem
This problem is described according to Lindley (1985) . The problem in which prior probability is not given is called Type I. The problem in which prior probability is given specific values is called Type 2.
Three prisoners, Alan, Barnard and Charles are in jail. Tomorrow two of these three prisoners will be executed. The subjects are asked to evaluate the probability of Alan's being freed. Alan or Charles is more likely to be freed, the probability of Alan's being treed now increases 1/2 rather than 1/3. The subjects are asked to evaluate the probability of Alan's being freed.
[Type 2] The prior probability of being freed is as follows: Alan's probability of being treed P(A)=1/4, Barnard's probability P(B)= 1/4. Charles's probability P(C)=1/2. (see Shimojo & Ichikawa, 1989) 4. Three Glasses Problem
In this case as in the Three Prisoners Problem, we define the problem which prior probability is not given as Type 1 and the problem is prior probability is :liven as Type 2.
[Type 11
Question I I see Figure 1 ):
The following experiment is done behind the screen. The subjects can't see this experiment.
There are three glasses of the same size, called A. B and C. The tester tries to throw a small stone into A, B or C from a distance until a stone falls into one of the three. We ask the subjects to evaluate the prior probability of A (stone in A), B
(stone in B) and C (stone in CI.
Question 2: After throwing the stone, it is always in one of the three glasses.
So either B or C is always empty. Then the tester shows the subjects which of B and C is empty. He tells glass B (C), if he finds the stone in glass C (B). If he finds both of B and C are empty, he tells B is empty when a tossed coin turns out to he heads, and C' otherwise.
We ask the subject to evaluate the posterior probability of A (stone in A), B (stone in B) and C'
(stone in C).
[ Type 2]
The area of the mouth of glass C is twice as large as glass A, or glass B. Then the prior probability of the stone in glass A is 1/4, glass B 1/4, and glass C 1/2.
Selection Problem
The subjects are asked to choose between two bets as follows;
(5-a) In the Ellsberg's Urn Problem (1-b), if one ball taken from the urn is red, you will receive 50,000 yen, and if the hall is black, you will also receive 50,000 yen, which do you prefer to bet on the red ball or the black ball'?
(5-b) One bet is associated with white or black, and the other with white or red. Which do you prefer'? 6. Reward Specification Problem
In the Ellsberg's Urn Problem 1-h), when one ball taken from the urn is red, you will receive 5o0mo yen. If the ball taken from the urn is black, how much reward would you expect in order to participate in this bet? The subjects are also asked to specify the reward they need to participate in the bet on the white ball, black or white, black or red, and red or white against the bet on the red ball Subjects One hundred and forty-two undergraduate students answered the items of Question ( I-a), Question (14), Question (2), Question (3-Type I ), Question (4-Type I), Question(5) and Question(6). Sixty-one undergraduate students only answered the items of Question (3-Type 2), Question (4-Type 2). The subjects' knowledge about probability theory is at an elementary level at best.
Procedure
Our experiment procedure is as follows: I. We first explained to the subjects about the terms of "subjective probability" and "50%
Bayesian credibility interval" and how to answer the questions before this experiment. 2. The subjects evaluated "subjective probability" and "50% credibility interval" for each problem. As an index of this "confidence level of probability assessment", we used the length of a Table 2 Relation of addtivity and selection of bet 50%c credibility interval. In order to make this index positively related to the confidence level, we substracted this length from one. That is (confidence level)=1(50% credibility interval). Note that the maximum value of the length of the 50% credibility interval is one, and this index ranges form zero to one. For simplicity, we use the notation d (red) to denote the confidence level for probability assessment for a red ball taken. Note that 0 S d(red) S l and the more confident you are about your assessment, the bigger the index is. 3. Finally the subjects are asked to give the preferences among bets of Question 5. Then they are asked to answer the reward to participate in the bet in Question 6.
Result Table I compares the subjective probability and its confidence level between the Ellsberg's Urn Problem (I-a) and the Tennis Problem. It is clear that there is more difference in terms of the confidence level.
Table 2 (a) shows the number of subjects whose probability evaluation was additive in that P(black or white)=P(black)+P(white), P(white or red)=P(white)+P(red), and P(red or black)= P(red)+P(black) in the Ellsberg's Urn Problem (lb). Table 2 (a) also shows the preference pattern in Question (5-a) and Question (5-b) of the subjects whose probability evaluation was additive. Table   2 (b) shows the responses of Question (5-a) and Question (5-b) for those whose evaluation was non-additive. Note that if one prefers the bet with "red" to the bet with "black" , he should prefer "white or red" to "white or black" , but the data shows the opposite tendency both for the "additive" probability appraisers and non-additive appraisers.
Some argue that the Ellsberg's Paradox can be explained by a non-additive measure of uncertainty such as the Choquet Integral (Schmeidler, 1989; Camerer & Weber, 1992) , but the data of Tables 2 (a) and 2 (b) show that most subjects' responses obey the mathematical law of probability, but still their responses are paradoxical.
Then what is the key concept to explain this paradox. Table 3 shows the averages and standard deviations (within parentheses) of the probability and confidence level. It is clear that the confidence level d(red) is bigger than d(black) and similarly d(white or black) is bigger than d(white or red), and these differences are statistically significant (t( 141 (=9.48, p<.0I; 1(141 )=10.8, p<.01).
Also note that the averages are about the same. Table 3 implies the paradox can be explained by the difference of the confidence level. Table 4 provides more evidence that the confidence level changes betting behavior. Note that in Question 6, we assumed the more reward the subjects require, the more reluctant the subjects are to participate in the betting. Table 4 Correlation coefficients between differences of confidnece level and of reward those whose probability evaluation is additive all subjects Table 3 Means of subjective probability and confidence level Table 5 Frequency of subjective probability and means of confidence level (Type 1 ) on], both for those whose probability evaluation is additive and all subjects including the non-additive appraisers. All correlation coefficients are positive and statistically meaningful with p values in Table 4 . Tables 5 and 6 show the prior and posterior probabilities for the Three Prisoners Problem and the Three Glasses Problem and confidence levels for their assessments. The assessed probability values are not consistent with the Bayes theorem, even with the Three Glasses Problem, for which subjects can interpret the probability from the frequency viewpoint. Tables 5 and 6 can be explained by the higher order probability will he discussed in the next section.
Discussion-What is higher order probability?
In the first section, we posed three questions regarding the three hypotheses. After investigating Flexible Bayesian approach for decision making Table 6 Frequency of subjective probability and means of confidence level (Type 2) the data, what is our position about these questions? For hypothesis I, it seems clear that the higher order probability call explain the Ellsberg's Paradox better than the non-additive measure explanation. Shigemasu 119881 demonstrated the reason why subjects prefer the bet for which they can give more accurate probability by using the mixed distribution. They do so, because they know that similar betting situations will occur again and again in the future. But for the Three Prisoners Problem, it appears to be difficult to judge whether higher order probability can help explain the paradox. For hypothesis II, frequency interpretation seems to provide the perception that the subjects can appraise probability accurately, but it cannot help reduce the inherent paradoxes both in the Tennis Problem and the Three Glasses problem.
For hypothesis III, we study in this section whether higher order probability can be modeled by probability density function. Figure  3 ),
Then by integration and normalization, we obtain the following approximation for the posterior probability, P(AID)=.340 and P(CID)=.660.
This indicates the fuzzy approach can provide a 
